University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2001

Ten Truths about Tax Shelters
David A. Weisbach
dangelolawlib+davidweisbach@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David A. Weisbach, "Ten Truths about Tax Shelters" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 122, 2001).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

C HICAGO
JO H N M. O LIN P RO GRA M IN L AW & E CONOMICS W ORKING P APER N O . 122
(2 D SERIES)

T EN T RUTHS ABOUT T AX S HELTERS
David A. Weisbach

This p aper can be d ow nload ed w ithou t charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Ind ex:
http://www.law.uchicago.ed u/Law econ/index.html
The Social Scien ce Research Ne twork Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=268831
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Abstract

This paper advances ten propositions about tax shelters and tax avoidance. The first
four propositions argue that tax shelters must be analyzed solely by the consequences
of shelters and the responses, rejecting reasoning based on notions such as the right
to tax plan, legitimate tax planning, or statutory interpretation. The next three
propositions analyze the consequences of tax shelters by viewing shelters as
unintentional gaps in the tax base and attacks on shelters as similar to broadening the
base. At the margin, the benefits of broadening the base must be set equal to the
administrative costs of doing so and the propositions examine these costs and
benefits in detail. The last three propositions discuss issues relating to implementing
anti-shelter rules, including the problem of getting empirical estimates, and the role
uncertainty and motive should play.
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Ten Truths about Tax Shelters
David A. Weisbach*
May 10, 2001
Tax shelters are one of the most difficult topics in tax law. They are wrapped
up in a variety of complex issues, including statutory interpretation, efficiency,
problems of second best (for example, when the avoidance is of an inappropriate
tax), the use of incentives in the tax law, the effect of uncertainty of the tax law, the
appropriate use of rules and standards, disclosure of information, auditing
techniques, and the role of lawyers. It is also an area that is usually analyzed without
explicit regard for the consequences of approaches to the problem – the word
“legalistic” comes to mind. For example, many analyses begin by assuming taxpayers
have the right to alter their behavior to minimize taxes, without exploring whether
granting such a right makes sense.1 Others assume that the problem is one of
statutory interpretation – whether judges should read statutes purposefully or
whether they should stick with the literal language – without regard to the fact that
the statute itself can always be changed to include or exclude purposive elements and
that advice on the response to tax shelters should be addressed to more than just
courts.2
The goal of this paper is to push the thinking on shelters towards analysis of
the consequences of various regimes and away from legalistic thinking. I will do so
by making and defending ten propositions about tax shelters. Some of the
propositions criticize legalistic analysis, showing how that analysis often assumes its
conclusion or fails to deal with the important problems at hand. Other propositions
push toward consequentialist analysis, attempting to make small steps toward
understanding the consequences of various approaches to shelters.
While each proposition is distinct and stands on its own, I have tried to
organize them into a coherent argument. The argument has three basic components.
The first step is to clear away some of the underbrush. To this end, the first
proposition argues that statutory interpretation is not important in thinking about
shelters. Statutory interpretation is primarily about the allocation of authority
*

Professor, U niversity of Chicago L aw School. Preliminary d raft. Do not circu late
without p erm ission. Send co mments to d-weisbach@ uch icago.ed u.
1

For example, the current Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy has argued (while in a prior
role) that proposals to limit shelters should not inhibit “legitimate tax planning.” See
Washington Council Ernst & Young Comments on Corporate Tax Shelter Draft, 2000 TNT
146-21 (June 13, 2000). Similarly, most of the m ajor bar or trade associations are on record
as defending tax planning. See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on
Certain Tax Shelter Provisions, June 22, 1999; AICPA letter to Treasury, Tax Analyst Doc.
95-9765; TEI Calls for “Balanced” Solutions on Tax Shelter Problems, 83 Tax Note 1245
(1999).
2

See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 Chicago L.
Rev . 859 (1982).
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between branches of government while the policy question for shelters is to what
extent should tax planning be allowed. The second proposition is that we should not
assume when thinking about shelters that there is a “right” to minimize taxes.
Congress can limit tax planning however it chooses and, therefore, starting the
analysis by assuming a right inappropriately limits the analysis. The third proposition
is that all tax planning, not just planning associated with transactions traditionally or
commonly associated with shelters, causes inefficiencies and there is no a priori way
to distinguish shelters from any other tax planning. We should be suspicious of all
tax planning. The fourth proposition discusses the current proposals for disclosure.
The various bar associations have advocated disclosure as a cure for the currently
perceived shelter problem. This proposition maintains that to the extent there is a
problem under current law, disclosure as it is currently being considered, will not
help very much and to the extent it distracts from better solutions, it actually will
hurt.
The next several propositions lay out an analysis of shelters, focusing on the
consequences of responding to them. Proposition Five argues that we should
analyze shelters assuming a constant budget constraint. Somehow the money raised
from attacks on shelters will lead to lower taxes elsewhere. In particular, there is no
reason to believe that attacks on shelters will generally lead to an increase in taxes on
businesses or on capital income.
The sixth proposition argues that we can view shelters much like any other
omission to the tax base and that attempts to limit shelters are much like a
broadening of the tax base. The advantage of broadening the base is that it reduces
substitution from items in the base to untaxed items, the shelters. Broader bases are
generally more efficient than narrower bases. But broadening the base may be
administratively expensive. Identifying shelters is difficult, just like identifying
imputed rent is difficult and it is not clear that in all cases the benefits are worth the
administrative costs. Finally, because we cannot perfectly identify shelters, attacks
on shelters will lead to a collateral response – shelters will be restructured to avoid
the attacks. This response, which I label the distortionary effect, creates deadweight
loss and must be factored into the equation.
The last proposition in this section of the paper, Proposition Seven, discusses
how we should consider tax revenues in the analysis. Often commentators disparage
proposals as mere revenue grabs that have no basis in policy. This proposition
argues that such statements are nonsense – revenue is central to analyzing the
problem.
The last section of the paper, the last three propositions, discusses
implementation. Proposition Eight discusses empirical estimates of shelter activity
and argues that these estimates are surprisingly low given the attractive economics
of shelters. Until we understand why the level of sheltering is so low, it is difficult
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to make predictions about how shelters will respond to various attacks. Proposition
Nine discusses the trade off between rules-based and standards-based attacks on
shelters, focusing on uncertainty. The main point here is that uncertainty makes very
little difference and claiming that a tax law is uncertain says nothing about its merits.
Finally, Proposition Ten discusses the role of motive in addressing shelters, arguing
that motive should be considered in distinguishing transactions.
The ten propositions in no sense provide a complete analysis of the problem.
I am not ready to conclude at the end that we should address shelters by taking some
specific action. Instead, the goal is to push the discussion toward an analysis of the
consequences of shelters. Nevertheless, I think the analysis points in the direction
of significantly stronger attacks on shelters and other tax planning than are currently
being proposed.
1.

The shelter problem is not primarily about statutory interpretation.

A taxpayer examining a shelter under existing law will look at the response
to shelters as relating to statutory interpretation. The question for the taxpayer is the
tax treatment of a transaction, whether it is a transaction that is being planned or a
past transaction that is being challenged by the Service. The tax treatment will
depend on the relevant statutory language and whether any principles exist that
might over-ride the language – questions of statutory interpretation. That is, the tax
shelter question for taxpayers is, to a large extent, one of statutory interpretation,
pitting literal against purposive modes of interpretation.
The problem also looks like a problem of statutory interpretation to a judge
deciding cases. The judge must decide whether a given transaction that arguably
meets the literal language of some provision will be respected. The judge must
choose between purposive interpretation, literal interpretation, pragmatic
interpretation, or some other mode of deciding the case. Judges have also been
frequent and eloquent speakers on tax shelters, setting forth many of the basic
principles that we use today. Certain cases have become classic fact patterns and part
of the lexicon of the lawyer. The language of these cases, the paradigmatic or
authoritative statements on tax shelters, is often the language of statutory
interpretation, as is appropriate. Perhaps for this reason, many articles addressing
shelters approach the problem as one of statutory interpretation.3
The policy issues raised by shelters, however, are not about statutory
interpretation. The reason is that any method of statutory interpretation that is
deemed inappropriate under the internal logic or cannons of statutory interpretation
can be directly incorporated into the statute, converting the inappropriate

3

See, e.g., Isenbergh, Musings, note _ supra.
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interpretive method into a mandatory one. For example, suppose one concludes that
the appropriate method of interpretation is literalist, strictly following the words of
the statute regardless of consequences. One might base this conclusion on
separation of powers concerns or a belief that literalist interpretation is more likely
to reach congressional intent. 4 Someone following this reasoning, therefore, would
exclude considerations such as substance over form or the step transaction doctrine
as impermissible glosses on the statute. But this conclusion would say absolutely
nothing about the desirability of these doctrines. If they are desirable for
independent reasons, Congress can incorporate them directly into the statute. The
literalist would then be forced to use these doctrines when interpreting the tax law.
Another way to state the argument is that the statutory interpretation view
takes existing statutory law as fixed and asks the appropriate response. Courts sit in
this position. But statutes and regulations can be changed in any imaginable manner.
An understanding of how best to interpret existing statutes, while crucial to the
taxpayer or the judge, is entirely unhelpful in deciding how to craft new statutes or
amend old ones to respond to tax shelters.
This is not to say that statutory interpretation doesn’t affect how the statute
reads – if the statute is to be interpreted literally, the language of the statute might
be adjusted to achieve the correct policy. The language would look different if the
statutory interpretation method were, say, purposive. In general, holding policy
constant, the language of the statute will vary with interpretive methods. The
policymaker, therefore, must be aware of these issues. But they do not reflect the
ultimate content, only the drafting.
An argument that has been made against purposive interpretation in the tax
context is that the artificial forms relied upon in the tax world have no underlying
reality and, therefore, the judge has no choice but to interpret the words literally.
Asking a judge to interpret the words purposefully, under this argument, is asking
the impossible – statutes that rely on empty forms cannot be interpreted
purposefully by their very nature. This argument is usually associated with Joe
Isenbergh, who put the point pithily with the observation that “there is no natural
law of reverse triangular mergers.”5
But the argument, as Isenbergh said of the court decisions he criticizes,
simply collapses on close scrutiny.6 It simply does not follow that because Congress

4

See, Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold S tory of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stanford L . Rev. 18 33 (1998).
5

Isenbergh at 879.

6

Isenbergh at 874.
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is creating formal requirements for a particular treatment that it cannot restrict the
treatment in any way it chooses, including restricting them on the basis of business
purpose, motive, economic substance, or whether the documents are written in
Egyptian hieroglyphics. Congress could add to the list of requirements to get
treatment as a reverse triangular merger any of the doctrines disparaged by
Isenbergh. I’m not even sure that the argument tells us how courts should read
statutes. If Congress can include these terms but, when enacting the statute, did not
make them explicit because it assumed courts would include them, perhaps courts
should interpret the statute that way. But even if the argument is sound regarding
statutory interpretation, it tells us nothing about the appropriate response to shelters.
Statutory interpretation is a red herring. It is easy to view it as important
because it is the focus of many eloquent speakers on shelters, speakers who
happened to be deciding a case at the time. Practicing lawyers have also been
frequent commentators on shelters and their natural point of view focuses on
statutory interpretation because it is the focus of the advice they give clients. But it
is not the relevant policy question. Instead, the appropriate focus is on the actual
content of the law, whether it comes from congressional enactments alone, or some
combination of Congress, the Executive branch, and the courts.
2.

The shelter problem cannot be resolved by references to a right to minimize taxes, to the
scope of legitimate tax planning, or to various definitions of shelters.

Many analyses of shelters start with the proposition that taxpayers have a
right to alter their affairs to minimize taxes or that legitimate tax planning should not
be curtailed.7 It is understandable that many commentators begin with this
assumption because it is a truism of the case law, a right well-embedded in our tax
system. Learned Hand waxed eloquently on this point, and other judges have
followed in his path.8 We should not, however, assume any such right exists when
determining the appropriate response to shelters.
The so-called right to tax plan stems from case law. The most commonly
quoted statements on the right to tax plan come from Judge Hand’s opinion in

7
8

See sources cited in note __.

The number of cases citing this proposition is vast. Within the last several years, major
cases plan include Salina Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-352; Winn-Dixie v.
Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254 (1999); ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C.
Mem o 1998-305; ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); Saba
Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-359
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Gregory.9 While Hand cited two Supreme Court decisions, Isham10 and Bullen,11 he
essentially made it up.12 It came from the ether. There is absolutely no basis for
such a right in any source usually available to a judge.
The first place judges are supposed to look for the law is the statute. Hand,
however, does not point to statutory provisions granting such a right because he
cannot. Nothing in the tax law specifically grants a right to tax plan. Nor did he
refer to the legislative history. And he did not refer to more general principles of
statutory interpretation.13 If judges are supposed to interpret the law as passed by
the legislature, Hand’s decision to create a right to tax plan has no support
whatsoever.
One argument for a statutory basis for the right is that it is implicit in the

9

Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). Hand argued that
[A] tran saction otherwise within an exception of the tax law , does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or if one choose, to evade,
taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury;
there is not even a patriotic duty to increases one’s taxes.

For a similarly eloquent statement by Hand, see the statement in Commissioner v. Newm an,
159 F .2d 848, 850-5 1 (2d C ir. 1947) (H and, dissenting).
10

United States v. Isham , 84 U.S. 496 (18 73).

11

Bullen v. State of Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (19 16).

12

Alternatively, H and was faithfully follow ing prec edent, but the Ish am and B ullen co urts
made it up.
13

Bullen arguably states a general principal of statutory interpretation. It held that “when
the law draws a line, a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the
worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law permits.” 240 U.S.
__. But this haw two problems. First, if lines necessarily have this property, the law can be
changed, if desirable, to use fewer lines. Second, it is not clear why lines have to be
interpreted this way. C ourts can just as easily interp ret line s based on intent. Isham states
two reasons for allowing avoida nce of the stam p tax at issue. First, is that “if the d evice is
carried out by the me ans of legal form s, it is subject to no legal censu re.” 84 U.S. at __.
This statement is essentially identical to that in Bullen, and like that case, assumes the
conclusion. The second reason is that looking beyond form to substance in the case of that
particular tax, a stamp tax on negotiable instruments, would create inconvenience and
difficulties in the m onetary system . There is a strong need for negotiable instru ments to
trade freely. This reason does not necessarily extend beyond the particular tax considered
and does not support any particular interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. To the
extent that Hand relied on these cases for the “drawing the line” principle, he may have
correctly followed Suprem e Court com mand s on how to interpret the law. But as noted in
the text, finding a right to tax plan in the positive law is the worst case for those relying on a
right to tax plan because, if desirable, Congress can always change the law.
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language of the statute. The tax law refers to actions taken by taxpayers. If one does
not take these actions, the law, by its terms, does not apply. The implication is that
one is free to choose the actions one takes and merely apply the law as written. This
is close to Holmes’ famous statement about lines in the law, found in Bullen and
relied upon by Hand. It is also similar to the statutory interpretation argument
discussed above. The conclusion, however, doesn’t follow from the premise.
Congress could easily have intended the basic transactional rules to apply to everyday
business transactions but at the same time intended the benefits granted in the
statute to be severely restricted for tax motivated transactions. Or, alternatively, if
it did not intend that to be the case, it could.
Moreover, if the right were found to be implicit in the terms of the statute,
it is hard to see how calling it a “right” would helpful. Viewing something as a right
usually means there that is something profound or inviolate about it. But if the socalled right is just based on some language in the statute, nothing stops Congress
from changing the language. Essentially there would be no “right.” Instead there
would be a privilege granted in the statute and the debate would be about whether
the grant should be expanded, reduced, or even eliminated. This decision would
have to be based on the consequences rather than a pre-assumed right. Those who
depend on or hope for such a right would best argue against finding it in the statute.

If the right is based on a source more profound than mere statute, modifying
it might be more troublesome. We would not want to limit fundamental rights or
values. But Hand did not find the right in any such source. For example, Hand did
not find such a right in the Constitution or any other foundational documents of our
society. (These, of course, can be amended, but it is difficult to do so and analysts
might then be justified in treating the scope of tax planning as basically fixed were
such a right found there.) And the right to alter behavior to minimize taxes is not
a basic principle of moral philosophy. It does not, for example, rank with the
freedom of thought, speech, association, religion, or other principles supported by
moral philosophers.
To summarize, no moral or philosophical basis for the right to tax plan has
yet been articulated. There is no Constitutional right. There is no statutory right.
There is, in short, no basis for a right to tax plan other than statements made up out
of thin air by a few judges. Congress can limit or expand the scope of the right to
tax plan with the stroke of a pen. If it is desirable to restrict tax planning, it should
be restricted notwithstanding that doing so would reduce the scope of allowable
planning permitted under current law.
The same is true with attempts to derive the definition of a shelter from thin
air. One cannot derive the appropriate definition of shelters without considering the
consequences of such a definition. For example, one recent article began its analysis
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by defining tax shelters alternatively as “transactions taxpayers enter into with
unrelated parties merely to permit them to take dubious tax positions” or
“transactions that are entered into primarily for tax reasons.”14 Given these
definitions of shelters, it considers how to draft a statute that limits their benefits.
But the article has assumed its conclusion. Why, for example, should we limit
shelters to transactions that are entered into primarily for tax benefits? The
definition could easily have required that taxpayers enter into the transaction
exclusively for tax benefits, or alternatively, as transactions with any tax motivation
at all. And why require unrelated parties or dubious tax positions? Many
transactions that we might care about involve related parties and even if a transaction
does not involve a dubious tax position, we may want to change the law to disallow
the tax benefits. We cannot start out the analysis with a definition. Instead, the
definition must be the conclusion.15
Determining the scope of allowable tax planning requires analysis of the
consequences of tax planning and of attempts to stop it. Starting the analysis with
an assumed right to tax plan or a definition assumes the conclusion – the scope of
the assumed right or definition tells us exactly what tax planning should (must) be
permitted and what need not be. Instead, of assuming a right to tax plan, we should
determine the appropriate limits on tax planning and anything left is what is allowed.
3.

There is no social benefit to tax planning

If the above proposition is correct, there is no right to tax plan, in the sense
that there is nothing stopping Congress from limiting tax planning any way it
chooses. The immediate question is what is the value of tax planning. Perhaps tax
planning should be protected as a matter of policy, so that even if there is no “right,”
we get to the same place, following a different path.
But tax planning, all tax planning, not just planning associated with traditional
notions of shelters, produces nothing of value. Nothing is gained by finding new
ways to turn ordinary income into capital gain, push a gain offshore, or generate
losses. No new medicines are found, computer chips designed, or homeless housed
through tax planning. At a minimum, defenders of tax planning must justify why we
should care about a nonproductive activity.
Tax planning is actually far worse than that. It is almost always positively bad

14

See D avid Hariton, How to D efine “Corp orate Tax S helter,” Tax N otes p. 883 Au gust
9, 1999.
15

To be fair to the author, he merely claims to be showing how a statute can be drafted
consistent with these definitions, but b y ad opting these definitio ns as his baseline effectively
endorses them.
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for society – it is worse than worthless. Take a silly but instructive example.
Suppose a clever lawyer invents a new shelter called the backflip shelter. Under this
shelter, if you successfully perform a backflip, you get ten percent off your taxes.16
(A backflip is pretty straightforward compared to many shelters.) For each
individual, attempting the backflip is a good idea – the cost of the backflip is well less
than the taxes saved. But even though each individual may have a strong incentive
to do gymnastics, society is worse off. If everyone manages the backflip, nobody at
all saves taxes. Holding government spending constant, everyone’s taxes are exactly
the same with and without the backflip shelter, except that with the backflip, nominal
taxes are higher and are then reduced by the tax gymnastics. And even though taxes
are exactly the same, everyone is worse off because they had to do the backflip when
they otherwise could have happily gone about their business without such silliness.
Tax planning, to the extent it is like the back-flip example, potentially makes
everyone worse off.
Of course, not everyone will do backflips or otherwise act to reduce their
taxes, so there may be distributive consequences. The overall level of taxes is the
same, but those who shelter are better off at the expense of those who don’t. But
it is hard to see the distributive benefit of such an outcome. Those who tax plan are
not in some way more deserving of lower taxes than those who do not. There is no
reason why we would want to distribute money toward shelterers.17
Using this line of reasoning, tax planning can be analogized to an externality.
Those who tax plan impose costs on those who do not in the form of higher taxes.
The person who engages in the tax planning does not take that external cost into
account, nor is it reflected through the price system.18 There is, therefore, an
incentive to engage in too much sheltering. The polluter imposes costs on neighbors
that are not included in his cost/benefit calculation and, therefore, pollutes too
much. Tax planning, in this sense, is just like polluting. The usual cure for

16

Dan Shaviro uses the backflip analogy in his recent article on tax shelters and I thank
him for the analogy. See Daniel Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and
the Compaq Case , _ Tax Notes 221 (July 10, 2000).
17

One could co nstruct theories where disutility from p aying taxes varies am ong taxpaye rs.
Shelterers have a higher disutility from paying tax, as indicated by their revealed preference
of sheltering. In this case, a transfer of tax burdens from shelterers to others improves
welfare. It is doubtful that these distributive benefits, even if rea l, are sufficien tly large to
change the analysis.
18

The technical difference between tax planning and externalities is that externalities, as
classically defined, are actions that directly enter into another person’s utility function. See,
Hal Varian, Microeco nom ic Analysis 1992 (3d Edition), p. 432-439. Tax plann ing enters
others’ utility functions only because the government has to increase taxes as a result of the
reduction in revenues from planning.
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externalities is to force actors to internalize the costs imposed on others.19 The costs
imposed on others in the case of tax planning are precisely the reduction in taxes
from planning. If we make actors bear these costs, we would eliminate tax planning
altogether.
The terminology used above was “tax planning” not “tax shelters.” There
is nothing to distinguish shelters from all other planning – anytime anyone alters
their behavior because of taxes we have the same problem – the changed behavior
imposes costs on others that the person does not take into account. Therefore, the
conclusion above does not change based on whether the backflip was so-called
legitimate tax planning or a prohibited shelter. Although in the end, I agree that
most tax planning must be allowed merely because of the impossibility of identifying
it, the initial starting point should be that all tax planning, all altering of behavior in
response to taxes, should be suspect. It is only other limits on anti-planning devices,
such as the impossibility of identifying tax planning, that cause us to allow some tax
planning to continue.
Consequentialist analysis has now completely reversed the usual internal tax
logic. Rather than there being a right to tax plan which limits the possible antishelter rules, all tax planning should be eliminated if possible, subject only to the cost
of doing so.
A broad and general point such this will inevitably have some exceptions and
that is true here. There are functions of tax lawyers that are socially valuable and
even some tax planning may be valuable. In particular, tax lawyers representing
clients on audit or in litigation are performing basically the same role as others in our
adversary system. There is nothing any better or worse about tax lawyers in this
context than for lawyers representing clients before tribunals more generally. In
addition, tax lawyers acting as return preparers help interpret the law and ensure
compliance and these functions are socially valuable.
There may even be limited cases where tax planning is socially valuable. For
example, if Congress intended taxpayers to get a particular treatment for a general
type of transaction but required a particular form to get the treatment, helping
taxpayers meet the requirements seems to be socially valuable, although the
boundaries of this category are uncertain. It is as if the lawyer helped a client fill out
an application, making sure the right boxes were checked.
The most difficult case is where there is an obvious wart on the tax system
and tax lawyers help clients plan around the problem. For example, a given
transaction might be grossly over-taxed relative to others, creating economic

19

See Varian, note __.
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distortions. For various reasons, including the difficulty of drafting the law precisely,
planning may reduce the tax to the appropriate amount more cheaply than actually
amending the law. But this is a dangerous path because it depends on judgments
about the merits of the underlying law. It is generally not a defense to a violation of
the law that the law is stupid (try this next time you get pulled over for speeding).
It is, therefore, not clear that we should think that planning around warts in the law
is socially valuable.
A blanket statement that we should get rid of tax lawyers, therefore, would
clearly be too broad. But notwithstanding these cases where tax lawyers perform
valuable functions, we should not kid ourselves that tax planning is productive (or
is even merely worthless). In considering how to structure our tax law, tax planning
deserves little or no protection.
4. Disclosure is not enough.
Disclosure is the currently favored response to shelters.20 Those who
advocate increased disclosure have observed an increase in tax shelter activity and
argue that it creates a serious problem for the tax system. They argue that taxpayer
disclosure is the appropriate solution to the problem rather than a change to
substantive law. I have written elsewhere that, assuming there is a current problem,
disclosure is insufficient to solve it.21 Rather than repeat the argument in all its gory
details, I will just outline the general points.
Disclosure is important because it has the potential to change the likelihood
that a shelter is challenged. To the extent that disclosure increases the chance of
successful challenges, it can alter the economics of sheltering for the worse and,

20

The Joint Comm ittee on Taxation has generally argued for this approach. See Study of
Present-Law Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the Internal
Rev enue Service R estructuring an d Reform Act of 1998 (Including Pro visions R elating to
Corporate Tax Shelters), Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCS-3-99), (July 22,1999).
The bar associations ha ve supported this approac h and generally argu ed against changes to
substantiv e law . The Ne w Y ork State Bar Association T ax Section has bee n un equ ivocal in
this regard. See, e.g., the reports of the New York State Bar Association Tax Sections in Tax
Notes, May 10, 1999, p. 879, and Tax Notes, August 14, 2000, p. 937. The ABA has been
less clear but has generally advocated penalty and disclosure regimes and refrained from
supported changes to substantive law. See ABA Testimony Before the Ways & Means
Comm ittee, November 10, 1999, and Letter to Congressman Doggett Regarding H.R. 2255:
Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdow n Act of 1999, Septem ber 23, 1999. Perhaps the clearest
statement in favor of only using disclosure to address shelters is Peter Canellos, A Tax
Practitioner’s Perspective on S ubstance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business
Tran sactions and T ax Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 47 (2001).
21

See David A. Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU
L. Rev. 73 (20 01); David A . Weisbach, It’s Time to G et Serious Ab out Shelters, Tax N otes,
September 25, 2000 p. 1677.
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therefore, reduce sheltering somewhat. I do not think, however, that disclosure will
work as hoped for two reasons.
First, disclosure will not significantly change the likelihood of successful
audits. Disclosure forces tax shelters or promoters to send documents to
Washington detailing the structure of their shelters. That is, disclosure is aimed
primarily at giving information to the policymakers in Washington. There is nothing
about disclosure to the policymaking offices in Washington that necessarily increases
the chances of audit challenges.
Instead, documents and records that detail the specific shelter transactions
and that are available to auditors are the most important sources of successful
challenges. Rules enhancing the documents and records available on audit can be
changed or improved without regard to whether the documents are sent by taxpayers
to Washington. For example, the tax law requires taxpayers to reconcile their book
and tax records through a form known as Schedule M. Virtually no shelters in the
current market reduce book income, so Schedule M adjustments should point to way
to most shelters. Unfortunately, Schedule M is often obscure and complex. Making
Schedule M more useful would clearly be a productive enterprise, but this has
nothing to do with the disclosure proposals on the table. Similarly, the customer list
requirement, which requires to maintain a list of taxpayers who purchase shelters,
assists auditors in a way that disclosure of shelter information to Washington does
not.
The chances of successful audits may also change if there is central
coordination of attacks on shelters by experts in the transactions. Disclosure seems
to help here because the documents are sent to a centralized office. But
centralization of shelter audits can be achieved without disclosure through mere
internal communications within the Service. For example, the new Office of Tax
Shelter Analysis may be a great idea, but it can operate without the new disclosure
rules as long as it has close communications with the field auditors.
Disclosure rather than focusing on audits, is really about letting the
policymakers know about shelters. But the policymakers need to know about
shelters for only one reason – so that they can change to law where appropriate to
eliminate them.
This brings up the second problem with disclosure: many if not most shelters
work under current law. To the extent the disclosure proposals have any bite, they
are about making it easier to change substantive law. But if this is the case, we need
to compare this approach, disclosure of shelters followed by repeated amendments
to the law to shut them down, to other approaches to shelters, such significantly
increasing the strength of anti-tax avoidance doctrines. I, for one, do not think
repeated amendments to complicated rules is the better approach.

Ten Truths About Tax Shelters

Page 13

While I do not believe that disclosure is an effective policy, there is an even
more troubling, even if not surprising, aspect of the practitioner and bar association
support for disclosure. The same individuals claiming that the audit lottery is the
cause of the tax shelter boom offer opinions that the shelters entered into by their
clients work under current law. That is, the members of the bar associations, even
many at the highest levels of these organizations, individually spend vast portions of
their time analyzing shelters and concluding that the shelters in front of them work.
Some even peddle the shelters to third parties. But their policy recommendations
to the government are based on the hypothesis that most shelters do not work under
current law. If the shelters work under current law, they have nothing to fear from
the audit lottery. And if they have to fear changes in the audit lottery, their opinions
are incorrect.
I don’t know how to reconcile the bar associations’ actions with their words.
It looks to me like they do not want the government to notice the tax sheltering man
behind the curtain. Instead, they ask the government to pay attention to the smoke
and mirrors of disclosure. Worse, disclosure actually helps the members of the bar
associations. Disclosure leads to constant legal change to eliminate the shelter de jure.
It makes the law less stable and more complex. This means more work for tax
lawyers. They can command high fees for interpreting the latest changes and even
higher fees for structuring new shelters that avoid the changed rules.22
Perhaps one should not expect more from even well-intentioned individuals
who face strong monetary incentives to protect tax sheltering,23 but the serious
attention paid to the bar associations’ comments by the government worries me.
Disclosure is not a sufficient solution to the problem.
5.

Strengthening the shelter rules should not be an occasion for increasing the tax burden on
businesses.

One objection to strengthening the rules against shelters is that doing so
increases taxes on businesses. If the level of business taxes is already too high or just
right, increasing taxes on business would be inappropriate. It may be for this reason
that businesses often oppose strengthening the rules against shelters.
But changing the strength of anti-shelter rules should not be and does not
have to be an occasion to raise taxes on anyone. All of the revenue from
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strengthening anti-shelter rules can, if appropriate, be plowed back into the
businesses whence it came. The two, the strength of anti-shelter rules and the net
level of taxes on businesses are largely unconnected.24 The decision to respond to
shelters is about reducing tax avoidance behavior, not about taxing capital or
businesses more.
In fact, everyone can be better off if we do this. Suppose that the current
level of business taxes is about right, that it is otherwise a good idea to increase the
strength of some anti-shelter doctrine, that doing so reduces sheltering and increases
tax receipts, and that all of the increased tax receipts are used to reduce taxes on the
businesses that were previously avoiding tax. The businesses will have exactly the
same tax burden as before, but they will no longer have to engage in crazy tax
schemes like the backflip shelter. Everyone is better off.
The right way to think about the problem, therefore, is by holding total tax
receipts constant. In the jargon of economics, we should try to find the optimal tax
system subject to a constant budget constraint. If a tax law change raises additional
revenue, corresponding changes (such as changes to the overall rate structure) should
be made so that the government budget remains fixed. This procedure allows us to
make comparisons among different tax proposals to try to find the cheapest method
of raising the money. Any other method risks comparing apples and oranges – the
choice with the higher tax receipts is likely to look worse.
The idea of returning the money from shelters to businesses may strike some
as odd. If we catch someone with their hand in the cookie jar, we do not give them
the cookie. If businesses should not have been engaging in various shelters,
stopping the shelters while giving them the revenue seems perverse.
Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of this objection, it does not make
sense. The overall level of businesses taxes and the strength of anti-shelter rules are
largely independent.25 If business taxes are too low now, whether because of
sheltering or some other reason, they should be increased. Whether the taxes should
be increased by strengthening the rules against shelters or by some other method is
an independent decision about the merits of particular proposals. Similarly, if
business taxes are at the right level under current law, strengthening the rules against
shelters should not be an occasion for increasing business taxes.

24
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The problem businesses face in thinking this way is that they cannot force
policymakers to use money raised from anti-shelter laws to reduce taxes on the
businesses. If businesses requested an exchange of lower taxes for stronger antishelter rules, there is no guarantee that money raised from stronger anti-shelter rules
would not be used for other purposes. Congress could take only half of such a
proposal and, even holding revenue constant, give tax reductions to others. The
strategy of supporting stronger anti-shelter rules, therefore, is risky for businesses,
even if, in the long run it is likely to make them better off. Congress or the Treasury
could try to alleviate this problem by committing to using any revenue from antishelter laws to reduce business taxes, but they have not done so.
6.

Anti-shelter rules can be analyzed as gaps in the tax base

We are now (finally) ready to consider the consequences of limiting shelters.
I will take it in several steps, considering first the efficiency aspects of the problem
and then the distributional aspects. From an efficiency perspective, I will analyze
shelters as omissions from the tax base and attacks on shelters as similar to
expansions of the tax base. The analysis will have three parts. First, I will discuss
why shelters can be viewed as omissions to the tax base. Second, I will discuss a
general framework for determining the appropriate scope of the tax base. Finally,
I will apply framework to shelters.
Shelters can be viewed as omissions from the tax base. We might have
thought we were taxing income, but if the taxpayer creates the right capital structure,
buys and sells the right exotic derivatives while in a Carribean island, or structures
transactions through enough convoluted steps, no taxes are due. They are
fundamentally like any other omission to the tax base, such as the failure to tax fringe
benefits, imputed rent, unrealized appreciation, or much income from oil and gas
exploration. If a taxpayer engages in the right sort of activity, lower taxes are due.
The effects of shelters are very similar to the effects of other omissions from
the tax base, and, on the margin, the effects should be identical. Taxpayers shift
toward owner-occupied housing, fringe benefits, assets that produce long-term
capital gain, and oil and gas exploration because they are tax favored. They shift
toward exotic shelters because they are tax favored. In each case, they will shift to
the tax-favored activity until the marginal benefits are equal to the marginal benefits
available from other methods of reducing tax. Otherwise, the taxpayer could
substitute one avoidance method for another and pay lower taxes without increasing
costs. On the margin, therefore, the costs of shelters should be exactly the same as
the cost of other omissions from the tax base. In fact, from this perspective, there
really is no way to distinguish shelters from other omissions from the tax base.
There is no a priori definition of shelters, so that all we can observe is various taxinduced distortions in behavior as taxpayers move toward low-taxed activities.
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One may protest that shelters are different because in many shelters money
merely goes around in a circle (or to where it was going anyway through a more
complicated route). Shelters of this sort can be done indefinitely and involve no
economic costs or distortions. Other behaviors caused by omissions to the tax base,
such as a shift toward fringe benefits, owner-occupied housing, capital gain assets,
or oil and gas exploration, require real changes in economic behavior and, therefore,
are more limited.
But virtually all shelters have hidden costs, such as the costs of discovery,
design, and implementation. These are not really any different than the costs of
receiving compensation in less than desirable forms or living in owner-occupied
housing when rental housing is more desirable. We know these costs are present or
taxpayers would use shelters to eliminate all of their tax liability. One surface-level
difference is that the many of costs of shelters are transfers to shelter promoters
rather than direct costs. But shelter promoters incur opportunity costs, so the real
effect is the same. Unless taxpayers are sheltering all of their income (and the
evidence is that most don’t), they should be setting the marginal benefits of shelters
equal to the marginal benefits of other tax avoidance mechanisms.26
If we view shelters as gaps the in tax base, we can view attempts to reduce
shelters as expansions of the tax base. The proper scope of the tax base is a quite
general problem. In general, a broader tax base is more efficient. It reduces taxinduced substitutions to non-taxed activities and allows lower tax rates. The mantra

26

An alternative possibility is that shelters are truly costless but some external constraint
keep s taxpay ers from sheltering too m uch. For example, it may be costless to eliminate
capital incom e but imp ossible to use the se shelters to reduce w age income. In econom ic
jargon, there is a corner solution so that taxpayers do not set ma rginal costs equ al.
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from the 1986 act of “broad base, low rates” is widely accepted. But we do not want
to expand the tax base indefinitely because doing so would be too costly. For
example, the costs of taxing imputed rent on owner-occupied housing may well be
higher than the benefits. The costs of eliminating the realization rule may be higher
than the benefits. We only want to expand the tax base until the marginal benefits
equal the marginal administrative cost. We need, therefore, to consider more
carefully the costs and benefits.
The most obvious benefit of expanding the tax base is that doing so reduces
the incentive on taxpayers to substitute to non-taxed items. If we tax imputed rent
on owner-occupied housing, we reduce the tax distortions in the housing market.
If we tax fringe benefits, we reduce the distortions in compensation arrangements.
Tax-induced changes in behavior create deadweight loss, in the sense that taxpayers
are worse off because of the change in behavior but the government receives no tax
revenue. Reducing these tax-induced substitutions reduces the deadweight loss of
the tax system.
We can measure the benefit of reducing distortions as a change in the
compensated elasticity of taxable income, which is the percent change in taxable
income when the tax rate are changed. It measures the overall efficiency of a tax
because on the margin all omissions from the base have the same cost. Otherwise,
as discussed above, taxpayers could shift their behavior from high marginal cost
behaviors to lower marginal cost behavior and pay the same taxes.27 A high elasticity
of taxable income means that taxpayers are willing to shift their activities in response
to a tax rate change. This can occur because a primitive preference, such as labor
supply, is elastic but it can also occur because the tax base is narrow. Broadening the
tax base reduces the elasticity of taxable income because, with fewer avenues for tax
reduction, a change in tax rates will induce a smaller change in taxable income.
We can also view this benefit in terms of revenue rather than in terms of
utility. When the tax base is expanded, taxpayers have a lower incentive to alter
behavior to avoid tax, which means that they will shift somewhat back to taxed
activities that they previously avoided. They will, as a result, pay more tax. In fact,
it can be shown that under not unreasonable assumptions, the reduction in
deadweight loss and the revenue gain are basically the same.28
A second effect of expanding the tax base is that tax revenues will be
27
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increased because of the taxation of the previously untaxed good. If imputed rent
is taxed, many individuals will continue to live in their homes and pay new taxes as
a result. If fringe benefits are taxed, some compensation will still be in the form of
fringes and individuals will pay higher taxes as a result. Note that this source of
revenue is distinct from and in addition to the revenue discussed above, which
resulted from individuals shifting back into previously taxed items. Together, the
two sources of revenue add up to the overall revenue effect of expanding the base.
A third effect of expanding the base is that individual choice is restricted, in
the sense that previously untaxed items are now taxed. Because of the expanded
base (and leaving aside offsetting changes to the tax system to make the government
revenue neutral), taxpayers can consume or save less. Therefore, individual utility
will go down. For example, individuals currently have the choice of taxed cash
wages or tax-free fringe benefits. If we tax fringes, individuals will be worse off
because of the tax.
The final effect of expanding the base is that administrative expenses may
change. It is not always clear whether administrative expenses go up or down when
the base is expanded – a broad base may be administratively cheaper than a base
filled with many holes. For example, exemptions for income from oil and gas
exploration may make the system more complex and broadening the base by
eliminating the exemptions would simplify the system. But for most of the examples
mentioned above, fringe benefits, imputed rent, realization, and tax shelters,
broadening the base will generally increase administrative costs. Determining
imputed rent, calculating the consumption value of fringe benefits, or taxing
unrealized appreciation, would be expensive and difficult. And, as discussed below,
attacking tax shelters is not easy.
We can use these effects to determine the optimal scope of the tax base. At
the margin the cost of raising revenue by expanding the tax base must be equal to
the marginal cost of increasing the tax rate.29 Otherwise, we could expand or narrow
the base and improve welfare. For example, if the marginal cost of expanding the
tax base is less than the marginal cost of raising rates, we can expand the base and
lower the rates and improve welfare. Alternatively, if the marginal cost of raising
rates is lower than the marginal cost of expanding the base, we can narrow the base
and raise rates and improve welfare. It is conceivable that when we apply this
analysis to imputed rent, fringe benefits, realization, or other commonly discussed
gaps in the tax base, that expanding the base is not a good idea.
We need to apply this analysis to shelters. The obvious benefit of expanding
the base to reduce shelters is that it reduces the elasticity of taxable income – it
29
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reduces the incentive to distort behavior to reduce taxes. Equivalently, fewer
resources are spent finding, creating, and structuring shelters. This is usually the
stated goal of attacks on shelters – attacks on shelters prevent taxpayers from altering
their behavior to reduce tax.
Expanding the tax base often raises revenue through the new tax on the
previously untaxed item. In the case of shelters, however, we should expect little tax
from this source. If a shelter is taxed, nobody does it any more. Nobody in their
right mind does transactions like the ACM transaction, dividend strips, or corporate
owned life insurance without tax incentives and when the incentives are removed,
the transactions disappear.30 Therefore, the only source of revenue from attacking
shelters is that limiting shelters prevents taxpayers from shifting into untaxed activity.
As noted above, this source of revenue is equivalent to the reduction in deadweight
loss because behavior will be less distorted.
There are two costs to attacking shelters. The obvious cost of attacking
shelters is that it is expensive. Whether we amend the law to eliminate shelters
through a rules-based approach, attack shelters through anti-abuse rules, expand
audit rates, or use some other method of combating shelters, the administrative costs
of running the tax system go up. (We cannot consider here the benefit of reducing
the costs of searching for shelters, which may go down as the number of shelters is
reduced, because this was included above.) For example, amending the statute to
eliminate known problems often makes the statute more complex. Anti-avoidance
doctrines often require information that is difficult to obtain, such as information
about mental states.
An equally important but less obvious cost of attacking shelters is that
shelters themselves may get worse.31 Consider anti-avoidance doctrines and imagine
a world where there are no anti-avoidance doctrines but all else is held equal.
Without anti-avoidance doctrines, taxpayers would be able to enter into costless
shelters. With no business purpose requirement, substance over form test, or
economic substance doctrine, taxpayers would quickly find a few cheap and powerful
shelters and do them to their hearts’ content. Because they would be perfect, they
would be just like taxpayers electing on their return to pay lower taxes. There would
be no empty glass buildings, useless master recordings, or offshore subsidiaries
holding bizarre financial products.
Now suppose we impose anti-shelter doctrines such as the business purpose
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or economic substance doctrines. Shelters would not be eliminated. Instead, they
would become more exotic. The economic substance doctrine says that taxes can
be reduced only if there is a real change in economics. The business purpose
doctrine says taxes can be reduced only if there is a real business. These doctrines
create incentives to actually change behavior and taxpayers given these incentives
would do so, thereby creating distortion. I call this effect the distortionary effect of
anti-avoidance doctrines. It arises because enforcement is not perfect. Whether we
attack shelters through changes in the statutory rules or through anti-avoidance
doctrines, some tax-avoidance transactions will not be caught and taxpayers will have
an incentive to shift their activity to the remaining avoidance opportunities. These
avoidance opportunities will generally be worse than the ones they replace.
To take an actual example, consider the facts of Knetsch v. United States.32 Mr.
Knetsch borrowed money from an insurance company and purchased an annuity
from the same company with terms basically identical to the loan (other than the
insurance company’s fee). Interest payments were immediately deductible on the
loan but interest income was deferred on the annuity, creating a tax arbitrage. The
Supreme Court held that the transaction was a sham and disallowed the tax benefits.
After the Supreme Court’s decision, (and if section 264 had not been enacted), Mr.
Knetsch could still have received the tax benefits. To do so, all he would have had
to do was to alter the terms of either the loan or the annuity so that the payments did
not exactly match. The IRS, then, could not have asserted that the transaction was
a sham because it would not have been – it would have had real consequences.
The effect of the anti-avoidance doctrines in this case is to encourage Mr.
Knetsch to take risk. Under the decision, he can no longer move money in a perfect
circle and claim tax benefits. Instead, there must be some mismatch. It is as if we
are paying him to distort his economics. He probably does not want a mismatch, but
we give him huge tax benefits if he creates one.
Another example is the reaction to the decision in ACM v. Commissioner and
related cases.33 In ACM-type transactions, taxpayers used an enormously complex
offshore partnership to do essentially nothing while creating tax losses. The trick
involved a misallocation of basis when property is sold for a contingent payment to
be made in the future. Under the rules in effect at the time, basis was over-allocated
to late payments and under-allocated to early payments, effectively creating up-front
gain and loss later on. The offshore partnership, usually located in a Carribean tax
haven, allowed the gain to be allocated to a foreign bank which did not pay taxes and
the loss to be allocated to a domestic company to use against their taxable income.

32
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The transaction was structured so that as little as possible happened, primarily
through the use of financial instruments that hedged out all the risk and ensured that
money merely went in a circle. The courts have disallowed the claimed benefits of
this transaction on theories similar to those used in Knetsch.
What the taxpayers did wrong, commentators have noted, is that they did not
comply with the economic substance doctrine. On commentator suggested,
apparently seriously, that had they built an empty building in Bermuda where their
shell subsidiary was located, rather than just moving some paper around, they would
have won their case.34 But encouraging taxpayers to build empty buildings on
tropical islands that nobody wants to inhabit does not seem like the best policy.
In fact, this sort of advice, to adjust transactions to make them slightly more
“real” is the daily fare of transactional tax lawyers. They advise clients on how long
they must wait before a transaction is “old and cold” for corporate tax purposes.
They advise clients how much risk must be inserted into a costless collar to avoid the
constructive sale rules. They ensure that investors have just enough equity stake to
be considered partners, that financial instruments have enough debt-features to be
classified as debt, and so on. It is the attacks on shelters that creates the need for
this type of advice, and taxpayers heeding this advice are creating real economic
distortions.
The distortionary effect of attacks on shelters are not unique. Attacks on
shelters are like any other tax. They raise revenue at some cost. Part of the cost is
the mere administrative cost of the tax, such as filing, audits, litigation, and the like.
But an additional part of the cost is deadweight loss of the tax. In the case of things
we normally think of as taxes, such as the wage tax, the deadweight loss is caused by
decisions to alter behavior in the face of the tax toward lower-taxed items. This
deadweight loss arises even when we expand the tax base because some items are
inevitably left out, so that if we expand the wage tax to include fringe benefits, other
forms of tax-free compensation will be found because we cannot perfectly specify
the tax base. And even if we could perfectly define wages, individuals could always
work less. The distortionary effect of shelters is exactly the same – it is caused by
shifting toward the more expensive shelters that remain.
To summarize, we can view shelters as gaps in the tax base and attacks on
shelters as similar to other attempts to expand the tax base. Attacking shelters
reduces the incentive to distort behavior towards low-taxed shelters. Effectively,
reducing shelters reduces the elasticity of taxable income, making the system more
efficient. This can be restated in terms of revenue – if shelters are reduced, taxpayers
will shift less into shelters and stay more in taxable activities, so that tax receipts go
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up. The notion is basically the same, whether one thinks of it in terms of utility or
revenue. This comes at a cost. It is expensive to attack shelters, just like it might be
expensive to expand the tax base in other ways. In addition, because we cannot
perfectly identify shelters, attacks on shelters make those shelters that remain worse.
They have a distortionary effect. We should set strength of our attacks on shelters
so that the marginal cost of raising revenue this way equals the marginal cost of
raising revenue other ways.
My own view on the empirics, and these are nothing more than guesses, is
that the administrative costs of significantly expanding anti-shelter doctrines such as
the economic substance doctrine, would be low. It would be relatively cheap to
identify a vastly broader class of tax motivated transactions and disallow the benefits.
In addition, if anti-shelter doctrines are expanded significantly, the revenue effect or
utility effect would be reasonably large and the distortionary effect small. To avoid
taxes with a vastly expanded economic substance or other anti-avoidance doctrine,
taxpayers would have to significantly alter their behavior to avoid tax and my guess
is that most would be unwilling to do so, particularly if any revenue from reducing
shelters is used to lower tax rates.
The discussion so far has left out the distributional aspects of attacking
shelters. A common claim is that tax shelters reduce the progressivity of the tax
system because they are available only to the rich. Alternatively, shelters are more
readily available for capital income than for wage income. The capital income
portion of our tax is more progressive than the wage portion (so the argument might
go), so avoidance of the capital portion of the tax reduces progressivity.
Contrary to this intuition, however, there is no reason to think that reducing
shelters directly increases progressivity. If tax shelters were reduced, the extra
revenue could be used to reduce other taxes on the rich. That is, the existing
marginal rate structure might already take into account the existence of tax shelters.
Therefore, the distributional question seems somewhat independent of the efficiency
question. This is basically the argument of point five above, that attacks in shelters
need not mean that the tax on capital or on businesses will be increased.
There is, however, a more subtle connection between shelters and the
distribution of the tax burden. The connection is that attacks on shelters affect the
elasticity of taxable income and, therefore, the efficiency of the tax system.
Redistribution becomes cheaper when the tax system is implemented more
efficiently, and, under most views of the appropriate distribution of wealth in society,
we are likely to want more redistribution as it becomes cheaper. Therefore, attacks
on shelters might lead to more progressivity.35
35
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One can view the 1986 Act this way. The 1986 tax reform made the tax
system more efficient while leaving burdens basically the same. The reform was in
the spirit I have discussed for shelters, where the base is broadened and the money
raised from the broadened base is returned to the same people through lower rates
or other adjustments. But over the next decade, marginal rates on the wealthy were
repeatedly raised. Although one cannot know the underlying motivations, one factor
might have been that raising marginal rates on the wealthy was relatively cheaper
once the tax system had been made more efficient. One might expect to see a
similar effect if shelters were reduced significantly.
7.

Revenue matters

The discussion immediately above outlined the basic approach that I believe
we should take with respect to shelters. An important part of the analysis is tax
revenues and it is worth separately emphasizing the point. If attacking shelters did
not raise revenue, it would not be effective in reducing the deadweight loss caused
by shelters and, therefore, would not be a good idea.
Changing tax rules “merely” to raise revenue is not at all unprincipled. A
change that raises revenue cheaply is good tax policy and a change that does not raise
very much revenue but induces economic distortions is bad tax policy. This is true
even if the change has no relation whatsoever with the definition of income,
horizontal equity, or other traditional notions of tax policy. Thus, for example, the
idea that the deficits of the 1980's and 90's drove a relentless search for revenue and,
therefore, led to bad tax policy, is incoherent. Revenues and tax policy are
inextricably intertwined. There is no such thing as tax policy considered separately
from revenues.
One way to make the role revenue plays more explicit is to use the notion of
the marginal cost of funds. Daniel Shaviro’s recent paper on tax shelters used this
approach.36 The basic intuition is that all taxes create economic distortions. These
economic distortions impose some marginal economic cost for the next dollar of
revenue to be raised. We should set each tax so that the marginal cost of funds is the
same as for all other taxes. Otherwise, we can raise the tax with low marginal costs
of fund and lower the tax with high marginal costs of funds and be better off. We
would raise the same amount of money at a lower cost.
There are many ways to measure the marginal cost of funds, but one of the
simplest and most intuitive is the method proposed by Joel Slemrod and Shlomo
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Yitzhaki.37 They showed that marginal costs of funds can be measured by the ratio
of static revenue estimate (i.e., the estimate assuming no changes in behavior) and
the actual revenue estimate (i.e., the estimate assuming taxpayers shift their behavior
to avoid taxes). The lower the ratio, the better the tax (because the cost of funds is
lower). For example, if the ratio is one, taxpayers cannot adjust their behavior to
change their tax liability at all and, therefore, the tax is efficient.38 If, on the other
hand, the marginal cost of funds is high, taxpayers are altering their behavior a lot
because of the tax and the tax is inefficient. One of the nice aspects of this measure
of the cost of funds is that it is based on data that is routinely gathered for tax law
changes. In addition, it can be adjusted to take into account the administrative costs
of taxes.
Revenue is central to this approach. The measurement is based on how
much revenue a tax actually raises compared to how much it potentially raises.
There is no such thing as good tax policy absent revenue considerations. This is true
for shelters. Attacking shelters in a way that did not raise any revenue (i.e., did not
directly raise revenue, not a rule that raised revenue but was implemented with
compensating adjustments to make the entire package revenue neutral) would be bad
tax policy. The marginal efficiency cost or funds of such a tax law would be
extremely high and other sources of revenue would be more attractive. Similarly, an
attack on shelters that raised a lot of revenue may be efficient (although not
necessarily, depending how the static revenue estimate and administrative costs).
8.

It is surprising how little shelter activity there is.

The preceding three propositions outlined a general approach to the shelter
problem, but they are a long way from an actual proposal. The results will depend
on empirical outcomes and on implementation. For example, the approach discusses
general effects of attacks on shelters without distinguishing between amendments to
statutory rules and over-riding anti-abuse doctrines. The last three propositions
discuss a few of the implementation issues. This proposition is about some of the
empirical problems in estimating the effects of anti-shelter laws. The next
proposition dis about the trade off between rules-based and standards-based
approaches to shelters with particular focus on uncertainty. The last proposition is
about the role of motive in addressing shelters.
To determine the effects of shelters and attacks on shelters, we must have
empirical estimates of how shelter activity responds to various tax law changes.

37

Joel Slemro d & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The C ost of Taxation and the Marginal Cost of Funds,
International M onetary Fu nd W orking Paper (vol. 43, No.1 1 995).
38

In fact, can be less than one if one tax reduces the distortions caused by another tax,
such as when we expand the tax base.
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These estimates, however, are very hard to get. Many shelters are secret and
systematic data are difficult to obtain. We have anecdotal data from taxpayers,
practitioners, and promoters, but it is difficult to draw confident conclusions without
more. In addition, it is difficult to draw conclusions about how taxpayers respond
to various attacks on shelters from the static observations.
An even worse problem is that it is difficult to explain the available data.
Perhaps the most surprising fact about tax shelters is that there is not more
sheltering. This may seem an odd statement because the explosion of tax shelters
is considered by many to be one of the most pressing problems facing our system
today. But consider the economics of shelters. There are a wide variety of shelters
available, many of which can be done on virtually any scale.39 They allow taxpayers
to save taxes at very low economic cost. They are not quite, but sometimes not that
far off from, simply checking a box to pay less taxes. Moreover, the chances of any
given shelter being challenged are low, the chance of the challenge being successful
is low, and the chance of losing more than merely back-taxes plus interest is
extremely low. The economics, on their face, seem irresistible. It is not clear, given
the wide variety of shelters, why any business pays tax at all.
Of course, we don’t really know how much sheltering goes on, so it is hard
to make too many assertions about the issue. Shelters are notoriously hard to track.
They are generally not public transactions, they are almost always designed not to
alter book income, and they are sufficiently complex that examination of public
documents does not readily reveal their presence. There is no way to measure their
size directly. We are left with calculating the difference between tax payments and
various measures of corporate income, such as book income, and inferring that
portions of the difference that cannot be otherwise explained are due to shelters.
The numbers obtained with this methodology are large but not
overwhelming. For example, estimates tend to be in the $10 billion per year range.40
This number standing alone is substantial, but it is relatively small compared to the
actual corporate tax receipts of about $190 billion per year. Moreover, the mere fact
39

See Joseph Bankman, The New Market for Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775
(1999) for a description of some of these shelters.
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See, e.g., George K. Yin, How M uch of the Recent Evidence of a Corporate Tax Shelter
Problem is Explained by Increased Stock Option Activity?, University of Virginia School of
Law Public Law and Legal Theory W orking P aper 00-11. Yin’s stu dy is uniq ue in that it
controls for stock option activity, which creates a book-tax disparity but Yin also notes that
his sample size is insufficient to support strong conclusions. See also Martin Sullivan,
Lobbyist’s Figures Flawed, Data Indicate Corporate Shortfall, 86 Tax Notes 309 (2000); U.S.
Congre ssional Resea rch Service, Average E ffective C orporate Tax R ates (2 000).
PricewaterhouseC oopers estimates even lower revenue loss du e to corporate tax shelte rs.
See U.S. House Ways and means Comm ittee, hearing on “Corporate Tax Shelters,” 106 th
Cong. 1 st Sess. (199 9) (statem ent of K enneth J. Kies, PricewaterhouseC oopers).
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that we collect about $190 billion indicates that vast portions of corporate income
are not being sheltered. Individuals show a similar pattern, where the limited
attempts to study the issue show that individuals do not generally engage in
sophisticated planning to minimize taxes.41 While we cannot be sure, the evidence
is quite strong that only a small portion of corporate income (and income of high net
worth individuals) is sheltered. We do not have any satisfactory theories to explain
these facts.
The issue is similar to the tax compliance issue – tax compliance should be
much lower than it is under existing theories of taxpayer behavior. The basic models
are built on Becker’s model of criminal behavior. In these models, individuals
consider the likelihood of detection and the sanction and compare this to the benefit
of avoidance (or criminal behavior, in the case of Becker’s models).42 They set the
marginal benefit from evasion equal to the marginal penalty. If individuals are risk
averse or the risk of detection goes up with evasion, there will be some optimal
amount of evasion.43
For these theories to explain the observed facts, the risk of shelters must
increase very rapidly as tax payments go down and businesses must be very risk
averse. The level of sheltering is too low to be explained under a model of this sort
unless risk and risk aversion are very high.
Risk might be high if a taxpayer shelters a lot because an auditor is much
more likely to challenge a tax return if it shows extremely low taxable income
(relative to some measure of actual income, such as book income) than if it shows
taxable income just a little off what might otherwise be expected. Similarly, a court
is more likely to disallow extremely aggressive use of shelters than mild use. So, for
example, a corporation may be able to shelter the first ten percent of its income with
relatively low risk, but the next ten percent may be riskier, and so forth. Sheltering
all or almost all of its income might be very risky. Given the risk return profile the
corporation desires, its desired beta, if you will, we should not expect corporations
to shelter all their income any more than we should expect them to put all of their
cash in extremely risky securities in search of a higher return.

41

See e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun & Douglas J. Skinner, How Do Taxes Affect Investors’ StockMarket Realizations? Evidence from Tax-Return Panel Data (University of Michigan
Working Paper 1991); Jame s M. Poterba, How Burdensom e Are C apital Gains Taxe s?
Evidence from the United States, 33 J. Pub. Ec on 157 (1987).
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See Joel Slemord and Sholomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration,
forthcoming, Handbook of Public Economics, for a summ ary of the literature.
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If individuals are not risk averse an d the likelihood of detection d oes not increase with
evasion, the solution will involve either paying all taxes due or paying none.
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Many practitioners have observed that corporations are very risk averse when
it comes to tax risk. But we need to explain the cause of the risk aversion better –
risk aversion would not normally be expected by corporations whose shareholders
can diversify. This is particularly true with respect to tax liability, which is unlikely
to play a huge role in the overall riskiness of the business. One way to explain this
better is to analyze corporations’ tolerance for shelters as a function of behavioral
norms, where the sanctions for sheltering are reputational or social.44 The story
might be that in the staid old world of corporate America, one simply did not take
extremely aggressive tax positions. The job of the tax director was to ensure
compliance and otherwise stay out of the way. If the tax director was too aggressive,
he or the corporation risked being labeled something bad, hence the norm-based
sanction. Tax directors could also hire outside counsel to help enforce this norm (by
offering conservative tax advice) against other parts of the business that would like
to be more aggressive. Practitioners have observed that this norm has broken down
in recent years and claim this explains the increase in shelter activity.
A norms-based theory may well explain corporate risk aversion, but it has not
been sufficiently studied to claim we understand it. We do not know why such a
norm would arise, why it would break down, and how it might constrain behavior,
particularly because shelters tend to be secret. Moreover, the norm would require
consistent violation of fiduciary duties to shareholders – it would be difficult to claim
that shareholders themselves enforce these norms on corporations. There is no
evidence that shareholders avoid corporations that take aggressive tax positions –
corporations that are household names that depend on the goodwill of the populace,
engage in very aggressive transactions.45
There are, therefore, plausible stories about the levels of risk and risk
aversion, although as just noted, we do not fully understand these effects. But even
with these stories, it is difficult to reconcile observed behavior with current theories.
The savings from shelters are simply too high given the plausible penalties.
Corporations can almost surely get a better return for the risk by investing in tax
shelters rather than in, say, marketable securities.
The seeming failure of corporations to use tax shelters to their full advantage
is not just a curious fact for academics to study. To design appropriate responses to

44

Eric Posner made a similar norms based argument for individual tax compliance. See
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corporate shelter case.
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shelters, we need to understand how taxpayers respond to incentives, which means
we need to understand what limits corporations’ use of shelters under current law.
For example, bar associations have argued that changes to the penalty structure are
sufficient to change behavior significantly. They assert this is true because penalties
are viewed as a terrible punishment compared with an equal dollar payment of back
taxes or interest – each dollar of penalties is equivalent to a very large number of
dollars in interest or back taxes. It is not at all clear why this might be true – an
uninitiated observer might think that a dollar is a dollar to a profit maximizing
corporation. One answer might be that penalties show incompetence. There are so
many shelters available with similar risk/return profiles that getting caught with
penalties indicates a failure to screen out the dogs properly. But the implication is
that increasing the dollar value of penalties will simply lead to more careful screening
rather than a real change in behavior. Moreover, applying penalties to a broader
class of transactions, so that they no longer indicate incompetence, would have no
special effect – at that point, a dollar would become a dollar. The bar associations
simply point to observed behavior, but without a better understanding, we cannot
predict reactions to changes in the rules.
I cannot over-emphasize what a pivotal point this is. We need to understand
phenomenon such as the response to penalties if we are to determine the appropriate
response to shelters. The elasticity, how much shelters decrease for an increase in
penalties, a change to an anti-avoidance rule, or some other strategy, is a central fact
in responding to shelters. Yet, right now, we do not have a good understanding of
taxpayer behavior.
9.

The Effects of Uncertainty are Uncertain.

There are two common approaches to shelters. One approach is to amend
the substantive law once a shelter is found to eliminate the gap or hole that the
shelter uses. For example, section 264 was added to the Code to eliminate the
transaction entered into by Mr. Knetsch, borrowing to buy a tax-deferred annuity.
The other approach is to use broad standards, commonly known as anti-abuse rules,
to deny tax benefits in certain loosely specified classes of transactions,
notwithstanding literal compliance with the rules. Many people have argued that
changes to the substantive law are preferable to broad anti-avoidance rules, the
primary reason being that changes to the substantive law provide more certainty. I
do not believe this claim about uncertainty has force. Before turning to uncertainty,
consider why we might was broad anti-avoidance rules at all.
The argument, which traces back to Surrey, is that broad anti-avoidance rules
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reduce the complexity of the law.46 A rules-based approach specifies the law in
advance of taxpayers acting (hence the desired certainty). If the tax law were fully
specified in advance, however, it would have to correctly specify the treatment of not
only everyday, common transactions but rare and unusual transactions as well. The
reason is that if a rare transaction is taxed incorrectly, that transaction will become
common as taxpayers take advantage of the problem. Therefore, a pure rule-based
system, one that is fully-specified in advance, will tend to be very complex. This in
fact is a reasonable description of many shelters we see today, where some obscure
detail in the tax law is used in completely unanticipated ways to create tax benefits.
Rules-based responses to these shelters tend to make the law more complicated.47
If, however, the law is not completely specified in advance, that is, if it takes
a standards-based or anti-avoidance rule approach, it can be less complex. The
reason is that rare transactions need only be dealt with as they arise. If rare
transactions are dealt with as they arise, taxpayers cannot count on their mistaxation.
There will, therefore, be less of an incentive to find mistaxed rare transactions
because there is no tax advantage to doing so. Thus, the rare transactions that arise
under the imperfectly implemented set of rules do not arise under the uncertain
standards and the law can be less complex.
We should expect, then, to see rules designed for everyday transactions
backed up by anti-avoidance doctrines that cover mistaxed, unusual transactions.
Congress or the Treasury can easily find out about common transactions and devise
appropriate tax rules for these cases. But to keep these rules relatively simple,
Congress or the Treasury must back up these rules with broad standards or antiavoidance rules to prevent the mistaxation of rare transactions. This mixed strategy
of rules and standards combines the best parts of rules with the simplicity allowed
by standards.
The criticism of this approach is that broad standards are seen as imposing
excessive uncertainty. This uncertainty, it is argued, imposes costs on taxpayers and
is a reason to minimize the use of broad anti-shelter doctrines. The tax law, it is
claimed, should provide clear answers to most questions. After all, people need to
fill out their tax returns.48
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See Stanley Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the
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This claim, however, is not based on any analysis of how uncertainty affects
behavior or welfare. In fact, it is not clear what the claim is based on other than
mere assertion and maybe force of habit, in that many tax laws now provide
significant certainty and people are used to this. It may also represent self-interest
by the tax bar to the extent that the ability to provide certain answers makes the
services offered by bar more valuable. To have credibility, the argument against
uncertainty must provide more.
There has, however, been surprisingly little analysis of uncertainty in the tax
law. We are left to turning to analyses of uncertainty in other contexts for guidance.
The most relevant analysis is a model of uncertainty in the tort law by Craswell and
Calfee.49 They consider a potential defendant in a tort suit who engages in a
beneficial behavior which also causes harm. At the social optimum, the marginal
benefit from the action equals the marginal harm. Tort damages, if perfectly set,
would force the defendant to pay damages or a fine equal to the harm caused if they
violate the legal standard of care. Craswell and Calfee then suppose that instead of
a fixed standard of care, the defendant faces an uncertain standard of care. The
probability of being found liable at any point is uncertain but goes up as the level of
care or level of the activity goes up.50
The defendant then chooses behavior that optimizes profits when subject to
this uncertain tort law. How does the defendant act? There is an incentive for the
defendant to take too little care because there is some chance of not getting caught
when engaging in bad behavior. Loosely, this is type 2 error – the chance that a
guilty defendant will go free. There is an offsetting incentive to take too much care
because each additional increment of care reduces the probability of being let off.
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Richard Craswell and John H . Calfee, Deterren ce and U ncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.
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More formally, they assume the defendant engaged in activity that is measured by the
variable x and has benefit B(x), with B`(x) > 0, and B``(x) < 0. The activity causes losses
L(x), L`(x) > 0, and L``(x) < 0. At th e optimu m, x is set at x* so that B `(x*) = L`(x*).
Suppose that there is some probability F(x) that the defendant is held liable for a given x,
F`(x) > 0. The defendant maximizes its net profits P(x) = B(x) - F(x)L(x). Differentiating
and evaluating the re sult at the soc ial optimum x*, we get
dP/dX = [1-F (x*)]L`(x*) - F`(x*)L (x*).
The first term on the right hand size is the gains to the defendant from reducing the size of
the potential fine L(x) by reducing x. The marginal reduction in the fine, L`(x) is discounted
by the chance of not being found liable, [1-F(x)]. Thus, the defendant w ill not face the full
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This creates an incen tive to set x too low. We cannot determ ine without m ore which term
dom inates.
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Loosely, the defendant is afraid of type 1 error – the chance of innocent behavior
being found guilty – and, therefore, increases care. We do not know which of these
two offsetting incentives dominates. Uncertainty could lead to either too much care
or too little care. Moreover, we do not even know a priori whether reducing
uncertainty will increase or decrease the level of care.
Craswell and Calfee’s observations apply directly to the tax law. Suppose
there is uncertainty about the tax effects of some behavior and there is some desired
effect (which could be minimal change from pre-tax behavior). For example, there
is uncertainty about whether a variety of instruments are debt or equity and about
whether various partnership transactions will be respected in light of the partnership
anti-abuse rule. The behavioral effect of the uncertainty cannot be predicted. It
could be the case that taxpayers will be too conservative because of the possibility
of type 2 error. But it could be the case that they are too aggressive, taking
advantage of type 1 error. We cannot tell whether the uncertainty has good or bad
effects. And we cannot determine whether reducing the uncertainty is a good or bad
idea. It can go either way. If this is the case, we should have no strong feelings
against uncertainty – increasing uncertainty may hurt, but so may decreasing it.
I believe those arguing against uncertainty would accept this but they posit
an additional fact. They argue that taxpayers vary in their risk aversion, so that
uncertainty affects taxpayers differently. The aggressive, or risk seeking, will react
to uncertainty by taking more aggressive tax positions, while the meek (or maybe
moral in some versions of the argument) will be deterred. This it might be argued
is unfair – uncertainty in the tax law helps the bad guys and hurts the good guys.
It is not clear, however, why this is more unfair than disparate responses to
other elements of taxation. Some individuals might be so averse to taxation of labor
income that they become beachcombers, while others may not be affected at all.
Some might save almost nothing because of the taxation of the time value return to
savings while others might save more. The hard workers and savers are taxed to the
benefit of the lazy and profligate. As long as individuals are diverse, identical tax
rules will affect them differently. Unless uncertainty is somehow special, it is hard
to see a significant fairness argument.
There are number of additional arguments about uncertainty and I will review
a few of them here. First, people have considered how uncertainty affects reporting
positions. In this regard, Suzanne Scotchmer and Joel Slemrod argue that
uncertainty creates incentives for taxpayers to report higher amounts on their tax
returns.51 They argue this affect occurs because of an asymmetry in the penalty
structure. Suppose a taxpayer reports a single number and there is uncertainty about
51
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the correctness of that number. If audited, the IRS will determine whether the
number is correct. If a taxpayer over-reports income and is audited, he gets a
refund. If he under-reports income by the same amount and is audited, he must pay
back taxes and, in addition, may be subject to a penalty. The penalty structure creates
an asymmetry between under and over-reporting. To minimize the effect of the
uncertainty, taxpayers will report a higher amount than otherwise. The greater the
uncertainty, the greater the asymmetry and the higher the number taxpayers report.
The bar associations’, in addition to recommending more disclosure, have
recommended enhanced penalties and this fits well with the Scotchmer/Slemrod
theory – increasing penalties will increase the asymmetry and, therefore, cause
taxpayers to report higher incomes.
On the other hand, there is the possibility that greater uncertainty allows
more aggressive reporting positions. Suppose that taxpayers, because of their greater
bargaining ability, will capture the majority of the difference between the taxpayer’s
reported position and the government’s asserted tax liability, taxpayers. Greater
uncertainty allows greater dispersion of potential tax positions. Taxpayers will have
greater room to take aggressive positions and, knowing that they will capture the
majority of the surplus (i.e., the difference between their reporting position and the
government’s position) will have an incentive to do so. If this is true, more
uncertainty might lead to lower tax revenues.
Uncertainty may also create the possibility of corruption. The more
uncertain the tax law, the greater the discretion by tax auditors, and, therefore, the
opportunities for corruption.52 Clearly specified laws, on the other hand, reduce the
opportunities for corruption because they take discretion away from auditors. If
corruption is a serious problem, clearly specified laws may be necessary. Thousands
of years of history with corrupt tax collectors may explain the culture of certainty in
the tax law, but it is not clear how much this argument applies in today’s corporate
tax shelter context, where corporations significantly out gun the tax collector.
There is much more to say about uncertainty in the tax law. But we cannot
merely assert that uncertainty is bad without justifying the position carefully. We
need to specify exactly why it is bad in terms of the consequences. If tax law is
special, so that uncertainty is more important in the tax law than in, say, the tort law,
we need to specify why.
10.

Motive matters

The complaint about using anti-abuse doctrines to attack shelters that is
second only to uncertainty is that they inappropriately base tax results on intent or
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motive. Two taxpayers that engage in the identical transaction can be taxed
differently depending on what goes on in their head. The taxpayer with dirty tax
avoidance thoughts will get caught by an anti-avoidance rule but the taxpayer with
clean thoughts will not. Taxes, it is asserted, should be based on economics and two
taxpayers with the same economics, the same net income, should be taxed the same.

This argument just assumes its conclusion. It assumes that taxes should be
based on economics. It defines similarly situated taxpayers, to which we apply
notions of horizontal equity, as taxpayers with the same economics or the same
transaction. But this choice must be justified rather than just assumed.
Looking only to economics is not the standard approach taken in other areas
of the law or even in the tax law. The most obvious place that looks beyond actions
to motive or intent is criminal law. The definition of various crimes, including
serious crimes such as murder or rape, depend on the mental state of the defendant.
The consequences of the wrong mental state are not, in these cases, mere payment
of extra tax dollars. We take away peoples’ freedom and even execute them based
on their mental state. The legal definition of racial or other discrimination is often
based on intent.53 Contract law imposes a duty of good faith. Securities law fraud,
mail fraud, wire fraud, and insider trading all require scienter.54 Property law often
looks to intent, such as in the cases of abandonment and adverse possession.55 It is
not true that the law generally looks only to actions and not mental states.
Moreover, there are good reasons to base anti-avoidance doctrines on motive
or intent. There is a difference between somebody engaging in a transaction for
purely business reasons that happens to have fantastic tax consequences and
somebody entering into the transaction solely to reduce taxes. In the former case,
where the taxpayer enters into the transaction for business reasons, there is no
economic distortion caused by taxes – while the person pays low taxes, behavior is
not distorted by this prospect. In the latter case, where the motive is taxes, there are
real economic costs because behavior is distorted. The two cases are different
precisely because of mental states.
If one wants to think of this in horizontal equity terms, the two cases are not
53
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similar because they have different amounts of economic distortion. That is, rather
than defining horizontal equity in terms of economics, we can define it in terms of
economic distortion and, using this notion of horizontal equity, the two transactions
with different mental states should not be taxed the same.56 As Mark Gergen has put
it, “you can pick up tax gold if you find it in the street while going about your
business, but you cannot go hunting for it.” 57
Of course, it is hard to determine motive or intent. We cannot read minds.
Therefore, the use of motive or intent must be limited. This, however, is an
administrative concern rather than a fundamental or absolute argument against the
use of motive or intent. The question becomes how expensive it is to determine
motive. Like I suggested above, I think it would be relatively easy to identify a vastly
broader class of transactions as tax motivated and to eliminate their tax benefits. I
do not think it takes a mind-reader to know that transactions such as the transactions
in ACM, Winn-Dixie, or Compaq are substantially if not solely tax motivated and
courts could easily identify a much broader class of transactions as similarly tax
motivated. Therefore, the use of motive should be expanded rather than reduced.
Conclusion
Rather than summarize all ten propositions, let me go back to the basic goal
of the paper. The goal is to nudge the thinking on shelters towards analysis of the
consequences and away from internal tax logic or mere assertions of conclusions.
Statements about rights or legitimacy are not helpful in deciding on the appropriate
approach to shelters. The consequences of shelters and of attacking shelters are the
relevant considerations.
The consequences of various approaches to addressing shelters are complex
and conclusions will be based on contested empirical judgments. But these
complexities and lack of data should not obscure the thinking on the matter.
Ultimately we must make informed guesses about the empirics, and thinking through
the likely consequences can help identify the relevant empirical factors and perhaps
identify ways to measure these factors.
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